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CRANE'S FOOTNOTE 37 LAID
TO REST
Commissioner v. Tufts1
The question of whether the amount realized on the sale of real property
includes the full amount of nonrecourse debt2 when the mortgage debt exceeds
the fair market value of the property has plagued tax practitioners since the
Supreme Court's decision in Crane v. Commissioner.3 In Crane, the Court
held that nonrecourse debt must be included in the amount realized from the
sale of real property subject to such debt.4 The mortgage debt in Crane was
less than the fair market value of the property. 5 Footnote 37 suggested, how-
ever, that if the fair market value of the property was less than the amount of
the nonrecourse debt, then the amount realized might be limited to the prop-
erty's fair market value if the taxpayer received no boot0 on the disposition of
the property.'
Many commentators have criticized footnote 37 on the grounds that if
taxpayers are not always required to include the full amount of nonrecourse
debt in the amount realized upon disposition, there would be an enormous
potential for tax shelter abuse.8 This problem was created by the Crane hold-
1. 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
2. A nonrecourse debtor is not personally liable on the debt; the property is the
principal debtor. Such an in rem transaction can occur if the note and mortgage ex-
empt the mortgagor from personal liability, or if the mortgagor with personal liability
conveys the property to a person who takes subject to the mortgage and releases the
mortgagor from personal liability. See Dailey & Gaffney, Anatomy of a Real Estate
Tax Shelter: The Tax Reform Scalpel, 55 TAxEs 127, 139 (1977). See generally R.
KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE 148-50 (2d ed.
1981).
3. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. Id. at 13; see notes 22-32 and accompanying text infra.
5. 331 U.S. at 11-12.
6. In this context, boot means cash or other consideration used to balance an
exchange. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 166 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Under the Code,
"boot" generally refers to property exchanged that does not qualify under a non-recog-
nition provision. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031(b) (1982).
7. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the
mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit
equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encoun-
tered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to
the mortgage without receiving boot. This is not the case.
8. See, e.g., Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33
TAX L. REV. 277, 284 (1978); Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse
Debt, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1498, 1503 (1982); Comment, Tufts-The Resurrection of
1
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FOOTNOTE 37
ing, which requires that nonrecourse debt be included in the basis of property
acquired with the proceeds of such a loan, thus allowing depreciation deduc-
tions on the amount of the debt to be used to offset other income.9
As long as the full amount of the nonrecourse debt is included in the
amount realized from the sale, there is no tax shelter abuse. This inclusion
"recaptures" the benefits received by the taxpayer from being allowed to de-
preciate the amount of the debt. Abuse does result where the nonrecourse debt
exceeds the fair market value of the property and the amount realized from
the disposition of the property is limited to its fair market value. The taxpayer
has been allowed the benefit of depreciation deductions on the full amount of
the nonrecourse debt and must "recapture" only that portion of the nonre-
course debt as does not exceed the fair market value of the encumbered
property.
In Commissioner v. Tufts,1° the Supreme Court firmly rejected the foot-
note 37 implication and held that the fair market value of the underlying
property was irrelevant in determining the amount realized on the disposition
of such property."' Tufts renders an end to over thirty years of confusion con-
cerning Crane and will have an important impact in partnership taxation and
tax shelter planning.
In August, 1970, Tufts joined a general partnership. The partnership had
received a $1,851,500 nonrecourse loan, with which it constructed an apart-
ment complex. Due to poor economic conditions, the complex generated insuf-
ficient income for the partnership to pay any of the principal due on the
debt.1 2 In August, 1972, when the fair market value13 of the property did not
Crane's Footnote 37, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 575, 579 (1981). Although the potential for
abuse was recognized by the court of appeals in Tufts, the majority felt that any cor-
rection should come from legislative action, rather than through extending Crane, a
decision they had "serious reservations about." Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058,
1063-64 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
If non-recourse mortgages contribute to the basis of property, then they must
be included in the amount realized on its sale. Any other course would render
the concept of basis nonsensical by permitting sellers of mortgaged property.
to register large tax losses stemming from an inflated basis and a diminished
realization of gain. It would also permit depreciation deductions in excess of a
property holder's real investment which could never be subsequently
recaptured.
Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J.).
9. Crane, 331 U.S. at 11. See generally Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote
37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 16 TAX NOTES 803, 804 (1982); Comment, Contra Tufts:
The Case Against the Fair Market Value Limitation on Amount Realized, 14 PAc.
L.J. 79, 84-87 (1982).
10. 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
11. Id. at 1836.
12. Id. at 1828-29.
13. Fair market value is "the price at which. . . property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
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exceed $1,400,000, each partner sold his interest in the partnership 14 to an
unrelated third party, who received the apartment complex subject to the non-
recourse liability of $1,851,500. Each partner reported the sale on his individ-
ual income tax return for 1972, including the full amount of the nonrecourse
debt in the complex basis. Thus, each had been using that amount in the com-
putation of depreciation expense deductions. All indicated that a loss had been
suffered on the transaction.1 5 They argued that in determining the amount
realized on the sale, the nonrecourse liability could only be included to the
extent of the fair market value of the underlying property.16
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not dispute the inclusion of the
full amount of the nonrecourse debt in the basis of the partnership interest.
The IRS did, however, include the full amount of the debt in the amount
realized on the sale,17 which resulted in a taxable gain on each partner's pro-
portionate share of his interest in the partnership.18 The Tax Court agreed
with the IRS and ruled that the full amount of nonrecourse debt was includ-
able in the amount realized on the sales, even though the debt exceeded the
fair market value of the property.19 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the amount realized by the taxpayer
was limited to the fair market value of the property securing the nonrecourse
debt.20 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fair market value of the
underlying property was irrelevant and that the full amount of the outstanding
nonrecourse liability should be included in determining the amount realized. 21
An analysis of the issues in Tufts must begin with Crane. Mrs. Crane
inherited an apartment building that was subject to a nonrecourse mortgage
equal to the fair market value of the property. She held the property for sev-
eral years and included the full amount of the mortgage in calculating depre-
ciation expense deductions. Upon sale of the property, she reported a realized
gain of $2,500, the net amount of cash she had received from the buyer.22
14. The gain from a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership is treated
like the gain or loss from a sale or exchange of a capital asset, unless unrealized receiv-
ables or substantially appreciated inventory is involved. I.R.C. § 741 (1982).
15. Id. § 1001(a) provides that the loss from the sale of property shall be the
excess of the adjusted basis provided in id. § 1011 for determining loss over the amount
realized. Id. § 1001(b) defines "amount realized" as the sum of any money received
plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received.
16. Commissioner v. Tufts, 70 T.C. 756, 763 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th
Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
17. 70 T.C. at 762.
18. Id. at 761.
19. Id. at 770.
20. 651 F.2d at 1063. The court found that: (1) the taxpayers did not receive an
economic benefit in excess of the property's fair market value, id. at 1062; (2) the
concepts of adjusted basis and amount realized are not related, id. at 1064 n.9; and (3)
I.R.C. § 752 (1982) limits the amount realized to the property's fair market value, id.
at 1063 n.8.
21. 103 S. Ct. at 1836.
22. 331 U.S. at 3-4.
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Mrs. Crane maintained that this was the amount realized and that her equity
basis in the property was zero.23 The Court disagreed; it held that the full
amount of the nonrecourse debt was to be included in the amount realized
from the sale. 4
Unlike Tufts, the mortgage debt in Crane was less than the fair market
value of the property at the time of its sale.25 According to the Crane Court,
so long as the property is worth more than the amount for which it is mort-
gaged, the owner will continue to make his payments just as if he were person-
ally liable on the note.26 When the property is worth less than the mortgage,
the owner might abandon the property to the mortgagee, who could not then
collect any money from the owner on the nonrecourse loan.27 The ambiguity in
the Court's reasoning 28 led to conflicting decisions by courts confronted with
situations like Tufts. 29
Crane had two underlying rationales: the tax benefit theory 0 and eco-
nomic benefit analysis.31 The Crane result is the same under either theory,
since the fair market value of the property exceeded the amount of the
nornecourse debt.32 In cases such as Tufts, however, the distinction is critical.
In it simplest form, the tax benefit rule requires that the recovery within a
taxable year of an item previously deducted be included in gross income to the
extent it produced a tax benefit in the prior year.3 The concern in cases such
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Mrs. Crane was paid an additional $3,000 (less $500 expenses of sale) for
the property. Id. at 3. The Court apparently treated the sale as an arm's length
transaction.
26. 331 U.S. at 14. Otherwise, the owner would lose the difference between the
fair market value of the property and the mortgage when the mortgagee forecloses.
Such a course of action would not make economic sense.
27. See note 2 supra.
28. See Del Cotto, Basis & Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of
Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 82-88 (1969); see
also notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
29. Compare Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 215 (3d Cir. 1978) (tax
benefit analysis) with Tufts, 651 F.2d at 1062 (economic benefit analysis).
30. See Crane, 331 U.S. at 15-16.
31. Id. at 13-14. Although the Crane Court did not use the phrases "tax bene-
fit" or "economic benefit," the terminology has been widely used in connection with the
case. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 8, at 284.
32. Mrs. Crane received a net additional amount of $2,500, 331 U.S. at 3,
which means that in an arm's length transaction the property's fair market value ex-
ceeded the debt. Since economic benefit analysis places a fair market value limitation
only on the debt's inclusion in amount realized, the entire amount of the debt is in-
cluded so long as the fair market value of the property exceeds the amount of the debt,
as in Crane.
33. 1 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.34 (J. Doheny
rev. 1981). The Supreme Court recently characterized the tax benefit rule in Hillsboro
Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134 (1983):
[T]he tax benefit rule will "cancel out" an earlier deduction only when a
1984] 375
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as Tufts is with the depreciation expense deduction,34 which has provided the
taxpayer with an income tax shelter. 5 While specific "tax benefit" language is
not found in the Crane decision, the concept of a functional relationship be-
tween basis, depreciation, and amount realized, and the concept of "double
deductions," can be viewed as corollaries to tax benefit analysis.3
Under economic benefit analysis, before an amount can be taxable, there
must be a real gain to support that tax liability.31 It can be argued that a
taxpayer does not receive an economic benefit in excess of the property's fair
market value when she sells her partnership interest and the purchaser as-
sumes the nonrecourse liability. Because a nonrecourse mortgagor is not per-
sonally liable on the debt, none of her property other than the mortgaged real
estate can be used to satisfy the mortgage, and this would be the extent to
which the taxpayer really received anything in the transaction.38
If tax benefit analysis is used, the full amount of the nonrecourse liability
would be included in the amount realized, since this is the amount that has
been used in prior tax calculations to determine basis and depreciation. It is
generally recognized that the taxpayer should not be able to take advantage of
the double deductions 9 that would result if he is allowed to take depreciation
expense deductions based on the full amount of the nonrecourse debt but is not
forced to use an amount derived in a like manner when computing taxable
gain.' 0
A related argument which supports the "full inclusion" approach is that
the Code sections concerning basis,'4 1 depreciation, 42 and the amount realized
from sale 3 must be applied consistently to numbers that are symmetrical."
careful examination shows that the later event is indeed fundamentally incon-
sistent with the premise on which the deduction was initially based. That is, if
that event had occurred within the same taxable year, it would have fore-
closed the deduction.
Id. at 1143-44.
34. I.R.C. §§ 167-168 (1982).
35. Fairness requires that these deductions be recaptured when the property is
disposed of. See Bittker, supra note 8, at 283. I.R.C. § 111 (1982) codifies the tax
benefit rule as to bad debts, prior tax payments, and deliquency amounts. With certain
exceptions, the courts have applied the rule to recovery of all other losses, expenditures,
and accruals. See I J. MERTENS, supra note 33, § 7.34.
36. Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 18
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 9 (1982); see Crane, 331 U.S. at 15-16.
37. Tufts, 651 F.2d at 1062-63; see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207
(1920); 1 J. MERTENS, supra note 33, § 5.04.
38. See Del Cotto, supra note 28, at 85.
39. Commissioner v. Crane, 153 F.2d 504, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1945), afJd, 331
U.S. 1 (1947).
40. 331 U.S. at 15-16.
41. I.R.C. § 1012 (1982).
42. Id. §§ 167-168.
43. Id. § 1001.
44. See 331 U.S. at 12; see also Del Cotto, supra note 28, at 83-84.
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Otherwise, inequities occur,4 5 as illustrated by the lower court decisions in
Tufts. The Tax Court used the tax benefit analysis, in conjunction with an
analysis of I.R.C. section 75246 on partnerships, 47 while the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied economic benefit analysis. 48 Although both courts
purported to rely on Crane,49 the Fifth Circuit determined that the taxpayers
suffered a $55,740 loss,50 while the Tax Court found a $395,760 gain.
51
The loss determined by the Fifth Circuit is easy to see on paper but hard
to find in economic terms. The taxpayers had the benefit of depreciation ex-
pense deductions for the years that they held the property. 2 In those years
they were able to offset other income and decrease their taxes, sheltering the
income they received from other sources.53 If taxpayers who leverage to
achieve tax shelter results never have to account for the deductions they are
allowed to take (through inclusion of the entire amount of the debt in amount
realized at the time of the disposition of the property), then a loophole already
in existence would be excessively broadened.5
A discussion of double deductions does not appear until the concluding
45. Judge Thornberry, writing for the majority of the court of appeals in Tufts,
seemed confused on this point. He indicated that the Code is designed to solve the
double deduction problem by forcing a taxpayer to make adjustments for any deprecia-
tion he has previously taken. 651 F.2d at 1061. He was concerned with the adjusted
basis. Only the amount realized, however, was at issue. The double deduction problem
is solved if the nonrecourse debt is used for determining basis and amount realized. A
simple example will illustrate. T owned property with an original basis of $600 (all
nonrecourse debt). In years one and two, T takes a $10 depreciation expense deduction.
T "sells" the property when it has a fair market value of $500, but the nonrecourse
debt is still at $600. The adjusted basis of the property will be $580. See I.R.C. §§
1011, 1016 (1982). If the amount realized from the sale is limited to the fair market
value of the property, then T has lost $80 on the sale. The result is inequitable because
T has deducted $20 from a prior year's income without investing any after-tax dollars.
See also Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1980) (nonre-
course liability as basis in a gift transaction).
46. (1982).
47. See 70 T.C. at 763-70.
48. See 651 F.2d at 1059-63. Although the Fifth Circuit used this analysis,
Judge Thornberry indicated that the court did not like the theory and had "serious
reservations about the Crane decision," even when economic benefit analysis is used
instead of tax benefit analysis. Id. at 1062-63.
49. 651 F.2d at 1059-63; 70 T.C. at 763-64.
50. While the Fifth Circuit did not specifically set out this amount, it is the
figure that would result from the court's fair market value limitation on the debts in-
clusion in amount realized. Id. at 1063. The amount would be calculated as follows:
$1,400,000 (amount realized) less $1,455,740 (adjusted basis) equals $55,740 (loss).
51. 70 T.C. at 752; see note 17 supra.
52. 70 T.C. at 760.
53. Id. at 769-70; see, e.g., Newman, supra note 9, at 804; see also Note, Tax
Consequences of the Disposition of Property Subject to an Unassumed Mortgage, 49
COLUM. L. REV. 845, 849 (1949).
54. See Del Cotto, supra note 28, at 82-86.
6
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paragraph of Crane,55 where the Court also addressed Mrs. Crane's constitu-
tional argument. 5  The judges in the Fifth Circuit believed that the placement
of this phrase limited the applicability of tax benefit analysis to Mrs. Crane's
constitutional argument. 57 When the case is read as a whole, 8 the Fifth Cir-
cuit's conclusion seems unjustified.59
The implication of footnote 37 seems to be contrary to the basic policies
of Crane.6 0 If the mandates of footnote 37 are followed, there would be no
consistency between the amounts used to determine basis and depreciation,
and the figure used to determine the amount realized from the sale."' The
mortgage amount would be used in the former figure,6 2 while the lower fair
market value amount would be used to determine the latter figure.63
The open questions of footnote 37 are answered in Tufts.6 4 The Supreme
Court found that Crane did not rest on economic benefit analysis alone, but on
a broader analysis of the "obligation to repay and its subsequent extinguish-
ment." 65 More fundamentally, Tufts was based on the need for symmetrical
tax treatment of purchases and dispositions of property subject to nonrecourse
55. 331 U.S. at 15-16.
56. Id. Mrs. Crane argued unsuccessfully that she had no income within the
meaning of the sixteenth amendment. 331 U.S. at 15; see U.S. CONsT. amend. 16, § 1.
57. 651 F.2d at 1060.
58. See Crane, 331 U.S. at 6-16.
59. The Court concluded that the "crux of this case, really, is whether the law
permits her to exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing gain. If it
does, the taxpayer can enjoy a double deduction, in effect, on the same loss of assets."
Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
60. Some courts have refused to take footnote 37 literally and have followed the
basic policies of the Crane case even when the nonrecourse debt exceeds the fair mar-
ket value of the property. See, e.g., Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d at 215-16.
61. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
62. Crane requires the full amount of the nonrecourse liability to be included in
basis. 331 U.S. at 11. This amount will also be used in figuring depreciation. I.R.C. §
167(g) (1982).
63. Crane's footnote 37 implies a fair market value limitation.
64. The Tufts Court indicated that it merely followed Crane. 103 S. Ct. at
1831-34. This is not true. While Crane does stand for the proposition that nonrecourse
debt is a component of basis and amount realized, it does not mean that nonrecourse
debt is to be treated for all tax purposes as if it was a personal liability loan.
The Crane Court was working within the Code. Since Mrs. Crane inherited the
property from her husband, its initial basis was governed by I.R.C. § 113(a)(5) (1938)
(current version at I.R.C. § 1014 (1982)). Under this section, the basis of such prop-
erty was its fair market value at the decedent's death. Mrs. Crane argued that "prop-
erty" really meant equity, a position unsupported by the Code. The fact that a portion
of the fair market value consisted of nonrecourse debt was of no concern to the Crane
Court. Its concern with the basis element of computing gain or loss was whether "prop-
erty" should in that case mean "equity." Answering this question in the negative meant
that the full value of the debt was included in basis. From that point, the Crane deci-
sion rests on the idea that there must be a functional relationship between code sec-
tions. See 331 U.S. at 12-13; see also notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
65. 103 S. Ct. at 1832 n.8.
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debt.68
Initially, the Court observed that two tax advantages accompany a nonre-
course loan. First, the taxpayer receives money to purchase the property and is
not taxed on the receipt of such money because she has an obligation to repay
the money.67 Moreover, because there is an obligation to repay the loan, the
debt is included in the basis as a portion of the purchase price, which results in
larger depreciation deductions. 8 The Court concluded that these two advan-
tages must be taken into account when the taxpayer disposes of the encum-
bered property by including the full amount of the nonrecourse liability in the
amount realized, even when the debt exceeds the fair market value of the
property.6 9
The result is sound, but the analysis is somewhat lacking. Throughout its
opinion, the Court discussed a nonrecourse debtor's "obligation" to repay.70 In
this notion lies the fallacy. There is no real obligation on the part of a mortga-
gor unless she is personally liable on the loan. So long as the loan is nonre-
course, any "obligation" to repay is a result of the mortgagor's desire to keep
her equity in the property. She will repay the loan as long as the property is
worth as much or more than the outstanding loan on the property. When the
value of the property decreases substantially below the principal due on the
debt, the mortgagor's motivation to make the loan payments decreases. 7' If the
mortgagor chooses to discontinue repayment, the mortgagee can sell the prop-
erty to recover the debt. The mortgagee, however, has no cause of action
against the mortgagor for any deficiency, since the mortgagor has no personal
liability on a nonrecourse loan. The property is the principal debtor.72 Al-
though the failure to recognize this lack of obligation is a flaw, Tufts can be
defended as necessary for consistent application of the Code provisions.7
If there were no consistency in the method used to determine the relevant
numbers which are used to compute gain or loss upon the sale or disposition of
66. Id. at 1832.
67. Id. at 1831; see Stayton v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 940, 942-43 (1935); 1
J. MERTENS, supra note 33, § 5.12.
68. 103 S. Ct. at 1831-32.
69. Id. at 1832-34. The Court did not indicate that for policy reasons it was
choosing to treat nonrecourse debt as if it was a personal liability loan; rather, the
Court discussed nonrecourse indebtedness as identical to a personal liability loan. The
only difference is that the nonrecourse lender bears the risk of loss. Id. at 1833-34.
70. E.g., id. at 1833. The Court indicated that Crane was based on the assump-
tion that the debt would be fully repaid. Id. at 1832.
71. This is especially true when, as in Tufts, the mortgagor's default occurs
early in the repayment period. At such time, most of the money that the mortgagor has
paid to the mortgagee would represent interest, so the mortgagor would not lose a
substantial amount of money by discontinuing repayment.
72. See note 2 supra.
73. This concept was mentioned in Tufts. 103 S. Ct. at 1830. The necessity
arose because the Crane Court accepted the IRS position allowing the inclusion of
nonrecourse liability in basis, permitting the liability to be depreciated. The Tufts case
would not have arisen if Crane had placed an "at risk" limit on basis.
1984] 379
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property, the figures could be easily manipulated to the taxpayer's advantage.
If the full amount of nonrecourse debt is not included in amount realized,
taxpayers who use leveraging in a declining market would forever escape the
payment of tax.74 Tufts solved this tax problem. As a result, taxpayers who
use nonrecourse debt to finance real estate ventures will always include the full
amount of such nonrecourse debt upon disposition of that property. This will
be so even if the taxpayer has not been taking advantage of depreciation ex-
pense deductions in prior tax years and has therefore received no prior tax
benefit.75 No longer is there the potential for a taxpayer to have the tax bene-
fits of a nonrecourse loan without eventually being accountable for such bene-
fits through inclusion of the entire amount of the nonrecourse liability in the
amount realized." 
In addition to arguing the applicability of footnote 37, the taxpayers in
Tufts attempted to use I.R.C. section 752(c) 77 to support their contention that
the fair market value of the property limits the amount a taxpayer must in-
clude in amount realized on disposition of such property.78 The Supreme Court
interpreted section 752 as not placing any such limit on inclusion of nonre-
course debt in amount realized when a partnership is sold. Rather, the Court
viewed section 752(c) as limiting only the taxability of partnership contribu-
tions and distributions. 9
Subsections (c) and (d) of section 752 are of primary concern in Tufts.
Section 752(c) provides that a liability to which property is subject is treated
74. Realistically, the extent to which nonrecourse debt is included in amount
realized, beyond fair market value, will have little effect on the revenue taken in by the
Treasury each year. Typically, real estate does not decrease in value over time, and the
Tufts problem only occurs when such a decrease has taken place.
75. This is the position adopted by the Treasury. See notes 90-94 and accompa-
nying text infra.
76. The problem in Tufts never would have arisen were it not for the exclusion
of real estate from the "at risk" provisions. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1982). This
section is the IRS response to the position it advocated in Crane. See note 73 supra.
Under § 465 a taxpayer can take a loss deduction only to the extent that he has prop-
erty at risk. A person is at risk, in any particular venture, to the extent he has invested
cash, contributed property, or has outstanding personal liability loans. I.R.C. § 465(b)(1982). A taxpayer is not considered at risk for a nonrecourse loan. Id. § 465(b)(4).
77. (1982): "[A] liability to which property is subject shall, to the extent of the
fair market value of such property, be considered as a liabilty of the owner of the
property." This section applies only to a transaction between a partnership and its
partners.
78. 70 T.C. at 766. Section 752 is regarded as a codification of the Crane doc-
trine for partnerships. See Perry, Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters: The Crane
Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX L. REv. 525, 542 (1972) (citing A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION 195 (1971)). The Tax Court rejected the idea that § 752 imposed a fair
market value restriction on the amount of nonrecourse debt included in amount real-
ized. 70 T.C. at 769. The Fifth Circuit found a fair market value limitation through
use of economic benefit analysis and footnote 37. 651 F.2d at 1063. But see id. at
1065-66 (Williams, J., concurring) (fair value limit found in § 752).
79. 103 S. Ct. at 1834-36.
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FOOTNOTE 37
as a partner's liability to the extent of the fair market value of the property."0
Section 752(d) indicates that when an interest in a partnership is sold, one is
to follow the general rules for sales and exchanges of property.8 ' I.R.C. section
1001 is the general rule that deals with the determination of gain or loss on
the sale or other disposition of property.82 Gain or loss is determined by sub-
tracting the property's adjusted basis from the amount realized." "The
amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum
of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than
money) received." 8' In Tufts, the dispute between the taxpayers and the IRS
centered around the "amount realized" portion of the formula to determine
gain or loss. 85
The first problem in determining how much of the nonrecourse debt
should be included in the amount realized is whether to categorize nonrecourse
debt as property or money. Such a categorization is not easy since nonrecourse
indebtedness is itself somewhat illusory." If it is property, then section
1001(b) states that there would be a fair market value limitation on its inclu-
sion in amount realized, assuming the fair market value of the debt equals the
fair market value of the property.87 If the debt constitutes "money," then no
such express statutory limitation exists. There is ample support for the notion
that nonrecourse debt should be considered money and not property.88 Since
section 1001(b) is somewhat ambiguous on this issue,89 it is proper to look to
80. See note 77 supra.
81. (1982). In other words, one would use § 1001.
82. (1982).
83. Id. § 1001(A).
84. Id.
85. The taxpayers wanted the fair market value limitation implied in footnote
37 to apply, while the Commissioner wanted to include the full amount of the nonre-
course debt. 651 F.2d at 1060.
86. See note 2 supra.
87. Cf. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) (value of property received
equivalent to worth of property given up).
88. See, e.g., Crane, 331 U.S. at 13-14; see also United States v. Hendler, 303
U.S. 564, 566 (1938). But see Tufts, 651 F.2d at 1065 (Williams, J., concurring) (re-
lease from nonrecourse indebtedness must be considered property, and the fair market
value limitation should apply to the value of the underlying property).
89. The legislative history is not particularly helpful. Section 1001(b) traces its
origins to § 202(b) of the 1918 Act. 1 J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF FEDERAL INCOME AND ExcEss PROFITS TAX LAWS (1953-1939), at 1534 (1954).
Section 202(b) became § 202(c)(1) in the 1921 Act. 1 J. SEIDMAN, supra, at 1534. The
language used in these two codes, however, bears little resemblance to the present stat-
ute. See J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX
LAWS (1938-1861), at 789, 898 (1938).
The pertinent portion of § 1001(b) first appeared in its present form in the 1924
Act as § 202(c). 1 J. SEIDMAN, supra at 686. The full text of § 1001(b) contains some
limitations that are not pertinent to Tufts, which were added much later. This lan-
guage was carried forward, intact, to the 1926 Act as § 202(c), to the 1939 Act as §
111(b), and to the 1954 Act as § 1001(b). See 1 J. SEIDMAN, supra, at 1534.
While there is ample congressional discussion concerning the fair market value
1984]
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the Treasury Regulations for guidance.90
Regulation section 1.1001-2(b)O' indicates that a release from nonre-
course indebtedness should be considered money and not property.92 The regu-
lation also specifically states that the entire amount of the nonrecourse debt
should be included in the amount realized, even if the fair market value of the
underlying property is less than the total debt. 3 This regulation seems to
squarely answer the question posed by Tufts. While this regulation does not
have the force of law since it is interpretative in nature, it can be applied
retroactively,94 and that is important in Tufts since it was promulgated while
the case was pending.95 There is, however, one final area of inquiry: the valid-
ity of regulation section 1.1001-2(b).
In dealing with the Code, "[t]he choice among reasonable interpretations
is for the Commissioner, not the Courts." 96 In light of the philosophy underly-
ing Crane, regulation section 1.1001-2 seems quite reasonable. While footnote
37 might indicate that the Crane Court would not include the full amount of
the nonrecourse debt in amount realized when the fair market value of the
underlying property is less than the nonrecourse debt, the Court actually held
that the full amount of the debt involved in Crane should be so included. The
footnote was merely dictum. Regulation section 1.1001-2 is not inconsistent
limitation that § 1001(b) places on the inclusion of property in amount realized, there
is no discussion that is pertinent to the Tufts-type case. There is no indication whether
nonrecourse debt is to be considered "property" or "money." The congressional discus-
sion centered around the operation of the provision in the more typical situation and in
cases where the dispute was over fair market value of property other than money. I J.
SEIDEMAN, supra at 686. But cf Smith v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 725, 726 (9th Cir.
1953) (solvent third party's assumption of taxpayer's obligation may be "money re-
ceived" under § 1001(b)).
90. An interpretative regulation is proper where the code is ambiguous. Magru-
der v. Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Realty Corp., 316 U.S. 69, 74 (1942).
91. (1980). This regulation was promulgated on Dec. 12, 1980, during the
Tufts appeal.
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(b) provides:
The fair market value of the security at the time of sale or disposition is not
relevant for purposes of determining. . . the amount of liabilities from which
the taxpayer is discharged. . . .Thus, the fact that the fair market value of
the property is less than the amount of the liabilities it secures does not pre-
vent the full amount of those liabilities from being treated as money received
from the sale or other disposition of the property.
93. Id. § 1.1001-2(b).
94. The Secretary of the Treasury has broad discretion to prescribe the extent
of such a regulation's retroactive application. I.R.C. § 7805 (1982).
95. The decision by the Tax Court was announced in 1978; the regulation was
promulgated in 1980; the decision by the Fifth Circuit was announced in 1981.
96. Tufts, 651 F.2d at 1065 (Williams, J., concurring) (quoting National Muf-
fler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488 (1979)). Judge Williams
believed this regulation to be unreasonable because he felt that it conflicted with the
statute. This is due to his inappropriate categorization of nonrecourse debt as property.
See notes 88-89 supra.
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with the Code," nor is it inconsistent with Crane when that decision is viewed
in its totality. It constitutes a common sense solution to a problem created by
the uncertainties that grew out of footnote 37.
If I.R.C. section 752(d), through its incorporation of section 1001, is
used, there is no fair market value limitation on the portion of debt to be
included in amount realized.98 The question then becomes whether section
752(c) operates to impose a fair market value limitation on the sale of part-
nership interests.99 Section 752(c) does say "for purposes of this section,"
which seems to indicate that this section's fair market value limitation on the
inclusion of debt would also apply to subsection (d),100 which expressly covers
sales of an interest in a partnership. An examination of the legislative history
of section 752, however, indicates that subsection (c) was intended to be nar-
rowly applied, and that the sale of an interest in a partnership was intended to
be excepted from the fair market value limitation.101
Further support for the independence of subsection (d) is supplied by the
Treasury's regulation concerning section 752.102 In the regulation's discussion
of subsection (c), there are only two situations for which the use of the fair
market value limitation is indicated: when property subject to a liability is
contributed by a partner, or when property subject to a liability is distributed
to a partner.203 These two situations directly relate to subsections (a) and (b)
97. A court can invalidate a regulation only if it is unreasonable and inconsis-
tent with the Code. Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442, 449 (5th
Cir. 1980).
98. Under § 1001, the full amount of the nonrecourse liability is included in the
amount realized. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(1) (1980); see notes 90-95 and accompanying
text supra.
99. I.R.C. § 752 (1982). See text accompanying note 77-81 supra.
100. I.R.C. § 752(d) (1982).
101. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4376-77.
Frequently, a partner will assume partnership liabilities or a partnership
will assume a partner's liabilities. In some cases this occurs as the result of a
contribution of encumbered property by the partner to the partnership or as
the result of a distribution of such property by the partnership to the partner.
The provisions of this section prescribe the treatment for such transferred
liabilities . ..
The transfer of property subject to a liability by a partner to a partner-
ship, or by the partnership to a partner, shall, to the extent of the fair market
value of such property, be considered a transfer of the amount of liability
along with the property. ...
• ..When a partnership interest is sold or exchanged, the general rule
for the treatment of the sale or exchange of property will be applied.
Id. at A236-37, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4376-77.
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (1955). This regulation was issued when the 1954
code was enacted and thus is "entitled to great weight." 70 T.C. at 768 (citing Com-
missioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948); Fawcus Machine Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1931)).
103. While the regulation does not expressly state that these are the only in-
stances for the fair market value limitation, such an inference is logical. Treas. Reg. §
19841
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of section 752.104 No mention is made of the sale of an interest in the partner-
ship. Indeed, the regulation later reiterates that this is to be treated as "the
sale or exchange of property not associated with partnerships."' 0 5
The fair market value limit of section 752(c) was probably intended to
prevent partnerships from including excess debt in their bases. Upon sale of a
partnership interest, the partner no longer has a connection with the partner-
ship. His gain or loss is determined by deducting his adjusted basis in the
partnership from the amount realized from the sale. In such a case, he can
have a loss as well as a gain. The basis of the interest is not changed by the
transaction. The basis only determines whether the transaction itself will result
in a gain or loss to the taxpayer. Considering the above analysis of section 752,
the Supreme Court properly determined that the sale of the partnership inter-
est in Tufts would be governed by the ordinary sale or exchange rules of sec-
tion 1001.
In Tufts, the Supreme Court, through an expansion of Crane, effectively
adopted regulation section 1.1001-2. Since the full amount of the nonrecourse
debt will now always be included in amount realized, potential abuses in this
area of the tax law will be minimized. The Tufts decision is a logical way to
deal with the question of inclusion of nonrecourse debt in the amount realized.
Such a rule is necessary to insure that the computational results of determin-
ing gain and loss and disposition of encumbered property are fair to all
taxpayers.
Those who are able to take advantage of tax shelters must be accountable
at some point. That point arrives when the property is disposed of, and ac-
countability comes by including the entire amount of nonrecourse debt in
amount realized. Fairness requires this be done. The Tufts Court recognized
this need and rendered its decision accordingly. Finally, the question posed in
footnote 37 has been properly put to rest.
MARETA J. SMITH
1.752-1(c) (1955) provides:
Where property subject to a liability is contributed by a partner to a
partnership, or distributed by a partnership to a partner, the amount of the
liability, to an extent not exceeding the fair market value of the property at
the time of the contribution or distribution, shall be considered as a liability
assumed by the transferee.
104. I.R.C. § 752(a), (b) (1982); see note 76 supra.
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(d) (1955). As indicated in note 77 supra, to treat the
sale of an interest in a partnership in this manner means that the rules of § 1001 will
be followed and thus no fair market value limitation will be applied.
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